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David Howes* Faultless Reasoning:
Reconstructing the Foundations
of Civil Responsibility in Quebec
Since Codification
S'il pouvait arriver quelque cas qui ne ffit r~gl6 par aucune loi expresse on
6crite, il aurait pour loi les principes naturels de l'quit6, qui est la loi
universelle qui s'6tend A tout.'
I.
In The Civil Law System of the Province of Quebec, Jean-Gabriel Castel
writes,
To know the Quebec law of contract, it is sufficient to read the articles of
the Civil Code dealing with this topic and the cases decided since its
enactment. If in the common-law system it is absolutely necessary to know
history to understand, for instance, the essential division between law and
equity ... this is not the case in France or in Quebec. There, the civil law
is logically organized, it is not the product of a historical evolution or of
a long line of decided cases.2
Castel's conception of the Civil Code of Lower Canada (1866) as the
"common law" (droit commun) of Quebec, and the antithesis of the
English common law, is typical of the contemporary Quebec jurist.3 But
as John Brierley has suggested in a recent article entitled "Quebec's
'Common Laws' (droits communs): How many are there?" this
conception is unjust. There is not one Quebec droit commun but three,
and of those three the Code ranks third.
Which ranks first? According to Brierley: "those principles, variously
described as universal, general or super-eminent, that enacted law itself
*David Howes, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Concordia University, Montreal,
Quebec. This essay was first presented at the XIIIth International Congress of Comparative
Law, held in Montreal, in August 1990. I wish to thank Blaine Baker for the guidance,
S6bastien Gignac for the work as a research assistant, and the Fondation du Barreau du
Qu6bec for the grant which made this exploration possible. Only I can accept responsibility for
the opinions expressed in this essay.
I. M. Domat, Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel le droit public, et legum delectus, t. 1,
liv. pr6liminaire (Paris: Knapen, 1767) at 4.
2. J.-G. Castel, The Civil Law System of the Province of Quebec (Toronto: Butterworths,
1962) at 34.
3. See e.g. Office de R6vision du Code Civil, Projet du Code Civil (Qu6bec: Editeur Officiel,
1978) at xxvi-xxvii; J.-L. Baudouin, "I'interpr6tation du code civil qu6b6cois par Ia Cour
supreme du Canada" (1975), 53 Can. Bar. Rev. 715.
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supposes."' 4 The evidence for such an ius commune non scriptum as being
the foundation on which the Code itself rests is found in the remarks of
one of its draftsmen, Charles Dewey Day,
Every Code of Laws however full and complete it may be necessarily
presupposes not only the existence but also the knowledge of certain
primary and fundamental principles. These are Laws of God, of Nature,
and of common sense which must underlie and sustain all positive
legislation.5
Further evidence of the "common sense" dimension of Quebec's droit
commun(s) can be found in the Code itself, in such provisions as article
11 C.C.: "A judge cannot refuse to adjudicate under pretext of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law" (i.e. the enacted droit commun). It
can also be found in the numerous provisions of the Code which are
designed to infuse current community values and standards into the law,
for example, the reference to "the principles of natural equity" in article
429 C.C., to "public order and good morals" in article 13, to "fault" in
article 1053, and so on.
The second droit commun, according to Brierley, is that residing in
"historical fact". Unlike the French Code Napolion (1804), the Quebec
Code did not pretend to be a total statement of the existing law, only a
partial statement. Nor did it presume to abrogate the pre-existing law. In
fact, according to article 2613 (now article 2712) C.C., the former law
continues in force, except in cases of duplication or inconsistency.
The sources of this second droit commun (which could be called
"historic" to distinguish it from the "general" and the "enacted") are
heterogeneous. They consist of the elements of Roman Law, ancien droit
frangais, royal decrees, doctrinal opinion, judicial decisions, and much
else, in force in the Quebec of 1866.6 As Brierley has underlined, all those
sources, archaic as they may be, remain susceptible of application in
Quebec today, i titre de droit commun.
If Brierley is correct, it follows that the prevailing contemporary
conception of "the civil law system of Quebec" is unfounded. Contrary
to Castel, it is absolutely necessary for the jurist to "know history" to
understand the "system" within which he/she operates. Furthermore, if
4. J.E.C. Brierley, "Quebee's 'Common Laws' (droits communs): How many are there?" in
Milanges Louis-Philippe Pigeon (Montr6al: Wilson & Lafleur, 1989) 109 at 114.
5. Cited in Brierley, ibid at 115. The inspiration behind these remarks seems to have come
from Portalis, "Discours pr6liminaire prononc6 lors de Ia presentation du projet" in PA. Fenet,
ed., Recueil complet des travaux prparatoire du Code civil vol. 1 (Paris: Au Depot, rue Saint-
Andr6-des Arcs, 1827) 463.
6. See J.E.C. Brierley, "Quebec's Civil Law Codification: Viewed and Reviewed" (1968), 14
McGilLJ. 521.
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the "system" is to preserve its integrity, the jurist must remain open to
sources of law which transcend the perimeters of the Code, not closed to
them on account of the "threat" they pose to its (i.e. the Code's) alleged
"purity."7
This essay attempts to recapture some of the lost integrity of the civil
law system of Quebec by comparing how judges reasoned in the closing
decades of the nineteenth century with how they reason today. As we
shall see, the text of the Code has taken the place of the dictates of Day's
"common sense" as the ground of legal reasoning.8 The effects of that
displacement are nowhere more apparent than in the domain of "la
responsabilit6 civile" - hence the focus of the present essay.
It bears underlining that this essay is written in defense of the
proposition that under the civil law of Quebec there can be liability
independent of fault for acts causing damage. That proposition goes
against the drift of contemporary doctrine. According to most modem
commentators, in Quebec "la responsabilit6 repose sur la faute" - end
of discussionI9 That opinion is based on the words of article 1053 C.C.:
Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for the
damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act,
imprudence, neglect or want of skill
and a particular reading of the articles which follow.10
The articles in question impose responsibility for damage caused by the
acts of things under one's care, of children, of insane persons, of servants
and of workmen (art. 1054), of animals and of buildings (art. 1055). It
is assumed that those are cases where fault is "presumed" by the legislator
(i.e. fault in the surveillance of the child or animal, in the maintenance of
the building, etc.), and that this presumption can be rebutted. Hence,
according to the prevailing wisdom, the regime of responsibility for the
acts of others and of things is no more "objective" (risk-based), but just
as "subjective" (fault-based), as the regime of responsibility for an agent's
own acts. As a corollary, it is understood that article 1057 C.C., which
7. See J.-G. Castel, "Le juge Mignault - d6fenseur de l'int~grit6 du droit civil qu~b6cois",
(1975), 53 Can. Bar Rev. 544.
8. See D. Howes, "La domestication de la pens6e juridique qu6b&coise" (1989), 13(1)
Anthropologie et Soci6t6s 103 for an account of some of the reasons for this shift.
9. . Pineau and M. Ouellete, Thdorie de la responsabilitg civile, 2nd ed. (Mont~a: Th6mis,
1984) at 6-12; J.-L. Baudouin, La responsabiliti civile dilictuelle (Montreal: Presses de
l'Universit6 de Montreal, 1973) at 262; P.-A. Cr6peau, "Liability for Damage Caused by
Things From the Civil Law Point of View" (1962), 40 Can. Bar. Rev. 222 at 231-33.
10. For an alternative reading see D. Howes, "Dialogical jurisprudence" in W.W. Pue and
B. Wright, eds., Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Essays in Legal History (Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1988) at 71.
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concerns obligations which result "from the operation of law solely,"'"
such as those "of owners of adjoining properties," or those which "in
certain cases arise from fortuitous events," are exceptions to the regime
set forth in articles 1053, 1054 and 1055 C.C.
If to know the Quebec law of civil responsibility it were sufficient to
read the articles of the Code dealing with that subject and the cases which
mention those articles decided since its enactment, there would be no
reason to disturb the prevailing wisdom. But if the Code presupposes
knowledge of the laws of God, of nature, and of common sense - not
to mention history, - then there is every reason to be deeply disturbed
by the extent to which modem Quebec judges and commentators rest so
secure in the knowledge that in Quebec "la responsabilit6 repose sur la
faute."'12 As we shall see, the concept of "faute" was not clearly
distinguished from the idea of "fait" causing damage, before the 1920s.
As a result, legal actors were required to conform to significantly higher
standards of civil responsibility than those with which we modems are
familiar. This essay describes the break-up and dispersal of those
standards.
II.
One of the first published commentaries on the Civil Code of Lower
Canada was written by T.T.J. Loranger, a judge of the Quebec Court of
Appeal. In his Commentaires, Loranger (unlike Castel) displayed a lively
sense of how the legal culture of Quebec differed from that of France. He
stressed the fact that the Quebec Code (unlike the French) did not
abrogate pre-existing law. As a result, the Quebec judge and
commentator must hold "en conference continuelle" all of the sources
that lay behind the Code (and then some). As for the French judge and
commentator: "Le r6le de ce demier n'est pas de chercher en dehors du
texte, les lois sur lesquelles sont fond~es ses explications, la mati~re de son
commentaire. I1 ne remonte pas plus haute que le Code, qui est son
unique source, le premier comme le dernier mot de sa paraphrase."' 3
11. Part of the argument of this essay is that to confine the meaning of the term "law" as used
in article 1057 C.C. to "a positive enactment of the legislature" robs it of its proper resonance.
12. This slumber was disturbed by Nadeau J.'s decision in Lapierre v. R-G. Qudbec (1979),
C.S. 907. Nadeau J. upheld a proposition analogous to the one advanced in the present essay.
Of the many case comments on Lapierre the two that stand out the most for their defense of
"traditional" civilian doctrine are: P. Legrand, "Vaccination par l'Etat: droit de la sant6 et
th6orie des obligations juridiques" (1981), 26 McGill L.J. 880; and M. Goudreau, "l'affaire
Jacques Lapierre a Procureur Giniral du Quibec et aL devant la Cour d'appel -
Commentaire d'arr&" (1984), 15 R.G.D. 443.
13. T.T.J. Loranger, Commentaires sur le Code Civil du Bas Canada (Montral: Brassard,
1873) at 3. See also T. McCord, The Civil Code of Lower Canada (Montreal: Dawson Bros.,
1867).
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Loranger J.A. may be cited as one of the first exponents of the
"nomadic" method of codal interpretation, as opposed to the
"paraphrastic" or "linguistic" method (on which more later). His
approach was in keeping with the open texture of the Code itself (see the
discussion of article 2712 C.C. above). The nomadic method also found
support in one of the first privately printed editions of the Code, Lorimier
and Vilbon's La Bibliothbque du Code Civil published in 1871. The
purpose of that edition was to "r6unir dans un cadre, comparativement
restreint [i.e. two volumes of close to 500 pages each], un ensemble assez
complet des principales discussions sur chaque article de notre Code,
pr6sentant successivement les donn~es du droit Romain, du droit
Frangais et du droit Anglais, quelquefois m~me du droit Am&icain."' 14
The "discussions" in question were the sources identified in the Reports
of the Codification Commission as embodying the existing law of
Quebec. As the diversity of sources attests (Roman, French, English,
American - one could add: German, Scots), the law of Quebec was not
particular to Quebec but rather a syncresis (the word "synthesis" would
be too strong) of the legal wisdom of the North Atlantic world.
Loranger J.A.'s judicial decisions were consistent with the method he
espoused in his commentaries. Take the case of SL Charles v. Doutre.
That case involved an action in damages against the proprietor of a
sausage factory for the diminution of rent suffered by an adjacent
proprietor as a result of the offensive (and allegedly insalubrious) odours
emitted by the plant. The factory-owner argued, in part, that he had the
right to dispose of his property in "the most absolute manner" (the exact
words of article 406 C.C.), and that in any event he was authorized to
carry on his business by the municipality. Summing up the law on
nuisances caused by industrial establishments, Loranger J.A. wrote,
A mon sens, la loi sur ce point, est claire et se d&luit des principes les plus
16mentaires du droit civil, je pourrais dire des notions les plus simples du
droit naturel. Le droit est fond6 sur trois principes, disait [the Roman
jurisconsult] Ulpien, dont le second consiste A ne pas faire de tort A autrui,
nominem laedere, et c'est l'application de ce second principe qui doit
d.cider cette cause. Ne faire tort At personne, et r~parer ce tort quand il est
fait; tel est le principe fondamental de tout droit, qui fait en grande partie
la base du pacte social, et sur lequel sont fondus les articles 1053 et 1054
de notre Code, et la th~orie des drlits et quasi-drlits.15
14. C. de Lorimier & C. Vilbon, La Bibliothaque du Code Civil de la Province de Quibec
(Montral: Le Minerve, 1871) at 13.
15. Saint Charles v. Doutre (1874), 26 Rap. Jud. 25 at 27.
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Having dismissed the factory-owner's claim to an absolute right to
dispose of his property, Loranger J.A. went on to characterize the issue
raised by the case in his own way:
il s'agit de mesurer l'6tendue de la tol&ance que se doivent rciproque-
ment les maitres d'h6rtitages voisins. ... Voyons d'abord quels sont les
inconvdnients r~sultant de la contiguit6 de leurs heritages que les
propri~taires doivent supporter mutuellement, et quand nous aurons
trouv6 la rrgle qui fait la ligne de demarcation entre le fait imputable, c'est-
a-dire la faute, et celui qui ne l'est pas, nous verrons si elle s'applique i la
contiguit6 d'un 6tablissement industriel avec une propri6t6 bourgeoise, qui
est le cas actuel.16
Two things stand out about Loranger J.A.'s reasoning: the first is the
attention he paid to the principles of natural law, and the second his
inattention to what the Code says. The one follows naturally from the
other. What is meant here by "inattention to what the Code says" is that
Loranger J.A. was wrong to think that articles 1053 and 1054 can
support an action for damages independent of fault, or at least that is the
opinion of most modem commentators.17 But then they base their
interpretation on the words of the articles in question, whereas Loranger
J.A. (who did not bother to quote the articles, and perhaps for that reason
confused "fait" and "faute") based his decision on Ulpien's second
principle.
Another case in which "common sense" can be seen to have
triumphed over the express words of the Code is Doolan v. Corporation
of MontreaL The plaintiff in that case was a delivery man who had the
misfortune to be arrested and roughed up in the course of a police
operation to quell a public disturbance (in which Doolan himself had no
part). His action was for damages to his carriage and reputation. Given
the words of article 365 C.C. - corporations "cannot sue or be sued for
assaults, battery or other violence to the person" - Doolan's case ought
to have been dismissed. But as MacKay J. noted regarding an identical
rule (deriving from William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England) which formed part of the English common law,
"Many of the old technical rules affecting corporations are being
condemned and discarded," said Chancelor Kent.... He asked, why? and
he answered, because inconvenient and impolitic, leading sometimes to
mischief and injustice. Blackstone, and art. 365 of our code merely give
definitions. As in England, actions may be brought against corporations
for assaults by their servants, notwithstanding Blackstone and the common
law doctrine, so the same may be instituted here, notwithstanding the
16. /b/ at 28. See also Marcotte v. Hinault (1898), 13 Rap. Jud. 453.
17. See supra note 9.
96 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Code. Surely, under the generality of our Code corporations are not free
to assault by deputation, and to trespass at pleasure!'8
As the Doolan case illustrates, the Code was not a controlling authority
in the legal culture of the late nineteenth century: it "merely gave
definitions"! Judges tended to reason by analogy, not by the book.19
Perhaps the best example of the distances in time and space such
analogical reasoning can travel is Cimon J.A.'s judgment in Citj de
Quibec v. Mahoney. The facts in Mahoney were as follows: in order to
stop a fire from spreading the municipal authority ordered the demolition
of Mahoney's house. As things turned out, the fire was brought under
control and extinguished before it reached the dwelling, but the latter had
already been demolished. The question was whether Mahoney was owed
any indemnity by the city. (It will be appreciated that he had lost
something - his house - but there had been no corresponding gain -
the demolition made no difference to the outcome of the fire, which was
brought under control despite it.)
In responding to this question. Cimon J.A. took the litigants on a tour
of Roman law, natural law, the vieux droit civilfrangais and the Code
Napoleon, our statutary law, and the law of England and America. At the
end of his odyssey, he held the city liable for the damages, even though
its functionaries could not, strictly speaking, be said to have committed
any fault. All they did was act on the basis of what they perceived to be
a state of necessity.20
In reaching his conclusion, Cimon J.A. merrily dismissed the most
obvious textual argument in favour of his point - namely the argument
from article 407 C.C.:
No one can be compelled to give up his pyoperty except for public utility
and in consideration of a just indemnity previously paid.
18. Doolan v. Corporation ofMontreal(1868), 13 Lower Canada L. 71 at 73.
19. This is not to say that there are no cases in which the Code's provisions were examined
with the minute sort of attention we modems would expect. See e.g. McElwaine v. The
BalmoralHotel Co. (1891), 7 Montreal Law Reports 139. However, for every example of such
paraphrastic reasoning, there can be found a counterexample of reasoning in the nomadic
mode. Consider, for example, how Meredith J. concluded his judgment in Hogan v. The Grand
Trunk Railway Company of Canada (1878), 2 Quebec Law Reports 142: "as well upon the
reason of the thing, as upon general principles, and according to the foregoing authorities [the
Code is not listed among those authorities, though "Redfield on the Law of Railways," "Bell's
justly esteemed Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland" and "Pothier, Depot, No. 23" are
considered in some depth], it seems to me.. ." See further D. Howes, "From Polyjurality to
Monojurality: The Transformation of Quebec Law, 1875-1929 (1987), 32 McGill L.J. 523
[hereinafter "Polyjurality"].
20. Citd de Qudbec v. Mahoney (1901), 10 B.R. 378. This point cannot be too heavily
emphasized. At 414 Cimon J.A. states: "Cette demolition, m~me si elle a 6t6 une erreur de
jugement, n'est pas une ill~galit6, ni un dalit ou quasi-dalit, car la loi l'autorisait."
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Cimon J.A. noted that there had been a case before the French Cour de
cassation where "une demolition est, en pareil cas, appel~e 'expropria-
tion' (D.P. 66.1.75). Je crois cette qualification impropre. Mais
qu'importe l'expression!" 21
If the case was not one of expropriation, what was it then? Cimon J.A.
agreed with some of the most august authorities of all time - Lab~on
Puffendorf and Demolombe - that the case ought to be assimilated to
that ofjet ai la mer. That is, it was permissible, a "devoir public" even, to
demolish the house, for as a "potejuriste" of the vieux droit civil frangais
once said,
Ta causey va quand tu vois la muraille
De ton prochain brfiler ainsi que paille,
Le feu ardent malais~ment se dompte,
Si d'ypourvoir ii temps on n'y tient compte.2
However,
des interprtes de cet ancien droit frangais - et des meilleurs et des plus
autoris6s - se sont dit: mais abattre ainsi une maison pour arreter le
progr~s d'un incendie, c'est agir dans l'int6r& des maisons voisines, et, de
I, ils ont conclu qu'il fallait assimiler ce cas A celui dujet t la mer, et faire
indemniser le propri~taire de la maison d~molie, par les propri~taires des
maisons voisines sauv~es, par contribution.
C'est la ce que Puffendorf a dit etre l'opinion commune et la plus
conforme i l'equit6,23
It should be noted that Cimon J.A. made no mention of article 2450 C.C.
in his discussion of the case ofjet at la mer. That article provides:
Freight is payable upon the goods cast overboard for the preservation of
the ship and of the remainder of the cargo, and the value of such goods is
to be paid to the owner of them by contribution on general average.
The reason for his oversight is simple: article 2450 forms part of the
enacted droit commun. Cimon J.A.'s argument was pitched at a higher
level, that of the general droit commun, or as he put it, "les vrais principes
de justice et de notre droit civil". 24
The "generality" - or better, anti-positivism - of Cimon J.A.'s style
of reasoning becomes apparent when one examines how he circumvented
the problem that in none of the statutes that touch upon the incorporation
of the City of Quebec was there any provision stipulating that individuals
in Mahoney's position ought to be compensated. In fact, the only
21. bid at 401.
22. Ibid at 398.
23. Ibid
24. Ibid at410.
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provisions of any pertinence explicitly exempt the functionaries
responsible for ordering the demolition from liability for their decision.
Thus, Cimon J.A. reasoned on the basis of the silence of the various
statutes to the conclusion that because they did not prohibit
indemnification they must allow it. In this way he gave effect to the
historic droit commun of Quebec.
Cimon J.A. clinched his argument by acknowledging that in England
and America municipal corporations are not held responsible in like
circumstances unless their charters decree it, and immediately adding:
Mais, tout de meme, aux Etats-Unis, comme en Angleterre, les partisans
de la non-responsabilit6 des corporations, en pareil cas, parce que leur
charte ne la d~cr~te pas, ne peuvent s'emp~cher de remarquer que l'quit
exigerait le contraire; aussi, nombre de 16gislatures aux Etats-Unis ont
adopt6 des lois d~clarant que les municipalit~s devront une indemnit6,
d~montrant par Rb la fausset6 et l'injustice de la doctrine qui refuse une
indemnit6.25
Thus, very much as in Doolan, "equity" and "common sense" prevailed
over more positivistic constructions of the "intention" of a silent
legislature, and compensation was awarded on the basis of the historic
droit commun.
III.
Would Cimon J.A.'s decision carry the same authority today as it did
when it was written? It seems not, judging from the decisions of both the
Quebec Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada in Lapierre
v. PG. Qudbec. Saving the facts of the Lapierre case for treatment later,
let us examine how those courts responded to Mahoney, beginning with
the Court of Appeal.
As will be recalled, Cimon J.A. based his argument partly on equity
and partly on the analogy between the Mahoney situation and the case
of jet ei la mer. Concerning the argument from equity, McCarthy J.A.,
speaking for the Court of Appeal, wrote:
Dans notre syst~me l'equit6 en soi n'est pas une source d'obligations. Dans
certains cas exceptionnels, tels les articles 429, 1024 et 1044a et seq. C.C.,
il en est question, mais ce sont de ce fait des cas d'obligations qui
proc&lent de la loi seule.26
Evidently, McCarthy J.A.'s conception of "la loi seule" was much
narrower than Cimon J.A.'s. In fact, it was derived straight from the
definition of the term "loi" given in article 17 C.C.: "actes, statuts ou lois
de la province."
25. Ibid at 408.
26. R-G. Quebec v. Lapierre [1983] C.A. 631 at 634 [hereinafter "Lapierre (C.A.)"].
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One can imagine Cimon J.A.'s response to that: "Je crois cette
qualification impropre. Mais qu'importe l'expression!" The reason
"words" or "definitions" mattered so little to Cimon J.A. is clear enough:
he was a "man of principles." Thus, he would have been astonished at the
opposition between law and equity McCarthy J.A. set up, and the way
the latter limited the field of operation of equity to those cases where it
is explicitly mentioned in the Code. To Cimon J.A. our civil law was the
living embodiment of equity, or derived from equity, not opposed
thereto.27
The narrowness of McCarthy J.A.'s understanding of the term "loi"
(law = a positive enactment) helps to explain the narrowness of the
interpretation he gave to article 2712:
Cet article n'a pas pour effet, toutefois, d'introduire dans notre droit des
obligations de l'ancien droit frangais ou du droit romain. ... Si des
obligations de l'ancien droit frangais ou du droit romain se retrouvent dans
notre droit, c'est uniquement parce qu'elles ont 6t6 reprises par notre
l~gislature. 2s
McCarthy J.A. was correct to observe that article 2712 C.C. did not
"introduce" the obligations of the historic droit commun into our civil law
(for they have always been there), but wrong to claim that such
obligations have to have been "adopted" by the Quebec legislature if they
are to enjoy any application in the present. Quite the contrary, such
obligations apply automatically, "unless positive enactment has provided
otherwise." 29
27. Cimon J.A. could have found support for his position in Marcad&'s commentary on article
1370 of the Code Napoleon (the French equivalent of 1057 C.C.): "Quoique l'on fasse ... une
classe A part des obligations venant de la lol il est bien clair que, en d6finitive, toutes les autres
obligations, sans distinctions, viennent 6galement de la loi: toute obligation civile, quelle qu'elle
soit, vient d'un principe de l'equit6 naturelle, sanctionn6 par la loi positive. - Ainsi,
l'obligation que 'on dit venir du quasi-contrat de reception de l'indu provient de ce principe
d'quit, consacr6 par la loi, que nul ne doit s'enrichir au dtriment de 'autre. Dans les quasi-
contrats, dit Pothier lui-m~me, a qui est due la classification du Code, c'est la loi seule, ou
l'dquitd naturelle (il fallait dire aprbs I'dquit4 comme sanction de l'&quit&), qui produit
l'obligation, en rendant obligatoire le fait d'ou elle r6sulte (no 114)." V. Marcad6, Explication
thdorique et pratique du code civi vol. 5 (1873) at 249. Marcad6 goes on to show how
delictual and quasi-delictual and even contractual responsibility derive from equity, the former
from the principle that "tout dommage caus6 par un fait condamnable doit 8tre rtpar6 par
l'auteur de cc fait," the latter from the "principe d'dquit6 que tout homme doit tenir sa parole
et remplir ses promesses." Is it not strange that whereas for Marcad6 equity was the source of
law, for McCarthy J.A. law is the source of equity?
28. Lapierre (C.A.), supra, note 26 at 633-34.
29. Brierley, supra, note 2 at 119. The trick is to invoke them, and they are very rarely
invoked. Why? Because there is no time for the law student to take courses in legal history
anymore, and the skills of a historian are irrelevant anyway. To function as a lawyer now, all
the student need develop is skill at "cross-referencing codal articles." See D. Howes, "The
Origin and Demise of Legal Education in Quebec (or Hercules Bound)" (1989), 38 U.N.B.
W. 127.
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As the preceding discussion reveals, McCarthy J.A.'s interpretation of
article 2712 C.C. was more "backwards" than it was "narrow." That
reversal helps to explain why he was unable to perceive in Cimon J.A.'s
discussion of jet t la mer anything more than a reference to the content
of article 2450 C.C. (i.e. to the enacted droit commun).30 But what Cimon
J.A. was referring to by means of that discussion was the general droit
commun (i.e. the principle for which the case ofjet it la mer could be said
to stand). It would seem, therefore, that Cimon J.A.'s reasoning passed
"over the head" of his present-day counterpart.
That such was the case becomes apparent when one considers the ratio
McCarthy extracted from Mahoney: "Tout en se r~frant aux principes de
droit naturel et du droit civil frangais, le Tribunal a sembl6 s'appuyer
plut6t sur une loi particuli~re qui, dans une version ant~rieur du moins,
aurait pourvu A l'indemnisation en telles circonstances." 31 It will be
observed that McCarthy J.A. has inverted the relative importance Cimon
J.A. attached to the general and enacted droit commun respectively, and,
what is especially telling, surmised that Cimon J.A. based his decision on
"une loi particuli~re" when the latter did nothing of the sort! This leads
us to conclude that at some point between 1901 (the year Mahoney was
decided) and McCarthy J.A.'s judgment in Lapierre the whole legal
system (or in any event, the hierarchy of droits communs) got turned
upside down, with no one being the wiser.
Mahoney received even poorer reviews in the Supreme Court of
Canada. The late Justice Chouinard, speaking for the court, said simply:
"this case does not constitute an authority for the case at bar in view of
the fact that there was no statement of principle and it is not clearly
indicated whether the decision was based on ancient or modern French
law or on municipal law. '32
The difficulty the Supreme Court had in grasping the principle in
Mahoney is directly attributable to its current method of establishing
"fundamental principles". That method consists in "cross-referencing
codal articles", 33 an essentially inductive procedure, which is the opposite
of the traditional historico-deductive procedure of holding "en conf&ence
continuelle", as Loranger J.A. would say, all of the sources that lay
behind the Code.
In keeping with modem method, the question Chouinard J. posed for
himself was whether there was any
30. See Lapierre (C.A.), supra, note 26 at 633-34.
31. Ibid at 634.
32. Lapierre v. R-G. Qudbec, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 241 at 250 [hereinafter "Lapierre (SCC)"]
33. See R.A. Macdonald, "Understanding Civil Law Scholarship" (1985), 23 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 576.
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support provided by extrapolating [various] provisions of the Civil Code
... [for] a general principle of the civil law that damages suffered or costs
incurred by an individual for the benefit of the community must be borne
by the latter."34
Following counsel for the appellant's suggestion, Chouinard J. proceeded
to examine four categories of articles dealing with general average
contribution (arts. 2007, 2383, 2385, 2387, 2399, 2042, 2450, 2677,
2680, 2691, 2692 and 2709 C.C.), privileges and in particular the
question of expenditures in the common interest (arts. 1980, 1981, 1982,
1994, 1996, and 2009 C.C.), the reimbursement of necessary expenses
(arts. 4217, 1046, 1052, 1539, 1546, 1775, 1812, 1813, and 1973 C.C.),
and expropriation (art. 407 C.C.) respectively.
The "theory of general average contribution" (i.e. jet ii la mer) as
expressed in article 2450 C.C. was found, not surprisingly, to be "entirely
special to maritime law"; article 407 C.C. was found to be "a specific
application of the theory of unjust enrichment"; and so on for the other
two categories. In the final analysis, the four categories or "theories" did
not, therefore, add up to a "general principle" of the kind the appellants
were arguing for. (One wonders whether any principle could be
established by simply massing articles in that way.)
Following the lead of Pierre-Gabriel Jobin,35 it is of interest to note
that Chouinard J. referred inter alia to 47 different codal articles, but less
than half as many doctrinal works (21), and only 8 cases, whereas in
Mahoney, Cimon J.A. referred to 3 articles, 15 doctrinal works, and an
indefinite number of French, American and English cases (over 20
anyway). It is uncertain what significance can be attached to those
figures, for counting sources is no substitute for analysis of whether (or
not) they were undertood. But the disproportionate emphasis on codal
articles in Lapierre must point to something. What it suggests to me is
that at some point between 1901 and 1985 (the years the two cases were
decided) there occurred a positivization of the common sense of judges,
with regrettable consequences. As suggested previously, both the general
and historic dimensions of the droits commun(s) of Quebec appear to
have been forgotten.
IV.
When did this positivization take place and from whence did it proceed?
As discussed elsewhere, the decades of the 1920s and '30s appear to have
34. Lapierre (S.C.C.), supra, note 32 at 257-59, citing Cie Immobibhre Viger Lie v. Lauriat
Gigure Inc, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 67.
35. P.-G. Jobin, "Les R6actions de Ta doctrine A la cr6ation du droit civil qu6bkcois par les
juges: les d6buts d'une affaire de famille" (1980), 21 C du D. 257.
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constituted a watershed. 6 Those decades saw the elaboration and
enforcement of a new method of interpretation, which may be called the
"linguistic method." That method was the invention of the Judicial
Committee of the English Privy Council (the ultimate court of appeal for
Canadians down to 1949), and in particular Lord Sumner. According to
Lord Sumner, "the first step, the indispensable starting point, is to take
the Code itself and to examine its words, and to ask whether their
meaning is plain. Only if the enactment is not plain can light be usefully
sought from exterior sources. '37
The justification for the linguistic method was derived from the Privy
Council's experience with the English Bills of Exchange Ac4 and then
extended to the Quebec Civil Code. As Lord Herschell remarked in
relation to the former: "The purpose of such a statute surely was that on
any points specifically dealt with by it the law should be ascertained by
interpreting the language used instead of, as before, by roaming over a
vast number of authorities." 3 Hence the doctrine that "the Law is
determined by what is found in the Code," not behind i09 Those words
obviously ruled out the possibility of any further elaboration of the
nomadic method of interpretation.
It is ironic that the best-known critic of the new method, Pierre-Basile
Mignault, who sat on the Supreme Court of Canada from 1918 to 1929,
was also its most rigorous enforcer.40 The other Supreme Court
luminaries of that era, Justices Lyman Poore Duff and Francis Anglin,
could hardly be expected to have seen through the new method, since
they were common lawyers by training, and never succeeded at
internalizing the civilian way of thinking. As Anglin J. frankly admitted
in Shawinigan Carbide Co. v. Doucet
The master is not an insurer of the safety of his workmen, or servants, and
1am unable to understand the principle upon which some of the Quebec
decisions proceed, in which, apparently without invoking the provisions of
art. 1054 C.C., the employer has been held liable for injuries [caused by
machinery] due to latent defects4
Anglin J.'s inability to understand the principle of the decisions in
question is attributable to a variety of assumptions, all of which would
36. See Polyjurality, supra, note 19.
37. Quebec Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Vandry, [1920] A.C. 662 at 672 [hereinafter
"Vandry'].
38. Cited in Despatie v. Tremblay, [19211 A.C. 702 at 709.
39. b d
40. See, on the one hand, P.-B. Mignault, "Le Code civil de Ta province de Quebec et son
interpr6tation" (1935), 1 U.T.L.J. 104 or Castel, supra, note 6; and on the other Mignault J.'s
judgment in Regent Taxi v. Congrigation des Petits Frjres deMarie, [1929] S.C.R. 650 or Mile
End Milling Co. v. Peterborough Cereal Co. [1924] S.C.R. 120.
41. Shawinigan Carbide Co. v. Doucet (1909), 42 S.C.R. 281 at 337 (emphasis added).
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make perfect sense to the modem commentator, but were foreign to the
legal culture of the time. Thus, he assumed that an agent is responsible
only for injuries caused by his fault, and that a particular set of facts must
be comprehended by a particular article of the Code for there to be
liability. But as we have seen, Quebec judges were as likely to deduce
responsibility from such "general principles" or "vfit&s juridiques" as
"rien de ce qui appartient A quelqu'un ne peut nuire impunrment A un
autre," as to base their reasoning on a particular text of the Code.42 In
fact, they frequently neglected even to mention the latter - that is, they
failed to descend to the level of the enacted droit commun.
That fact makes it difficult to attach much credence to Jean-Louis
Baudouin's reconstruction of "la drcouverte jurisprudentielle de l'article
1054(1) C.C." based entirely on Supreme Court and Privy Council
decisions referring to the article in question.43 Baudouin sees the
"discovery" as commencing with Taschereau J.'s dissent in McArthur v.
Dominion Cartridge Co., which inspired the Privy Council to recognize
a regime of "presomption de fait (res ipsa loquitur)" for damage caused
by things.44 Before McArthur, according to Baudouin, "Le regime grnrral
de responsabilit6 des choses n'ayant pas une existence autonome, la
victime devait prouver aux termes de 'article 1053 C.C. la faute du
proprirtaire de l'objet qui avait caus6 le dommage."45
Baudouin's account of the pre-1901 state of the law is unjust. Already
in 1889 the Superior Court had decided that:
our law holds railways to repair damage caused by sparks from their
engines, even if they have used all known precautions to prevent it.
This seems to me to be a perfectly just and reasonable doctrine. The
railway company runs trains for their own profit; if the even inevitable
consequence is loss to private proprietors adjoining their line of railway, it
is the company, who makes the profit, that should bear such loss. 6
As this quotation suggests, the decision of the court in Leonard v.
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (1889), where reference is made to various
prior cases but no articles of the Code, not only points to the existence of
a fully autonomous regime of responsibility for damage caused by things,
but founds such responsibility on what is sometimes called "la thorie du
risque-profi'. 47 There is a problem here since that theory is not supposed
42. Ibid at 286-88. This statement of principle is derived from Fitzpatrick J.' decision in
Douce
43. See Baudouin, supra, note 9 at 284-90.
44. 1bid, at 284. See McArthur v. Dominion Cartridge Co. (1901), 31 S.C.R. 392; (1905) A.C.
72.
45. Ibidat 284.
46. Leonard v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (1889), 15 Quebec Law Reports 93 at 96-97.
47. See Pineau and Ouellette, supra, note 9 at 9. The judges of the time would have called it
"common sense".
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to have existed in Quebec law until Fitzpatrick J.'s decision in Doucet
(i.e. the year 1909). Even then, it is supposed to have been imported from
France, not to be indigenous. What is more, it is supposed to have been
banished from Quebec law by the Privy Council in Vandry.48 All of these
suppositions are false, as will become clear presently.
To appreciate the full extent to which modem commentators have
rendered foreign or extraneous all that was once integral to the highly
cosmopolitain (and principled) legal culture of nineteenth century
Quebec, it is necessary to go back to Doucet and retrace the path to
Vandry.
The Doucet case concerned a workman who sustained various injuries
as a result of an explosion in one of the company's furnaces, the cause of
which it was impossible to ascertain. As Baudouin correctly pointed out
concerning the Supreme Court decision in this affair, "Pour le juge
Fitzpatrick, l'employeur ne peut d6gager sa responsabilit6 que par la
preuve d'un cas fortuit, d'une force majeure, ou d'une faute de la victime,
la responsabilit6 6tant fond6 sur le risque d'exploitation."4 9 However,
when Baudouin claims that this case had the effect of substituting a
"pr~somption de faute clans le garde de la chose" for the "pr~somption de
fait" contemplated in McArthur, he errs. Such an interpretation is only
supportable if one follows Anglin J.'s decision in Doucet, not Fitzpatrick
J.'s.50
The next case to be considered is Norcross Bros. Ltd v. Gohier:
une action porte A la suite de la mort d'un ouvrier 6cras6 par un monte-
charge. La majorit6 des juges fut d'accord pour retenir la r~gle
fondamentale que l'article 1054(1) C.C. cr~ait A l'encontre du gardien de
la chose une pr~somption de faute susceptible d'8tre combattue par preuve
contraire. Dans l'espce, toutefois, la Cour en vint A la conclusion que la
drfenderesse n'avait pas rrussi A repousser la pr~somption en prouvant la
faute de la victime.51
The third case to be considered is Vandry v. Quebec Railway, Light
Heat and Power Co. (1920). That case involved an action for damages
brought by a plaintiff whose house burned down as a result of a surge of
electricity through its wiring. The surge was caused by a branch falling on
48. See Vandry, supra, note 37 at 671-72.
49. Baudouin, supra, note 9 at 285.
50. In Fitzpatrick J.'s own words at 288: "La partie pritendu responsable peut n'avoir ni la
connaissance du d~faut de construction, nile moyen de s'en rendre compte; mais, si elle en a
le soin et la garde, alors, d'apr8s les terms de l'article, elle est responsable des dommages causes
par la chose." It did not bother Fitzpatrick J. in the least that he was basing his judgment on
words which had "rest~s inapergus, comme le dit Planiol, pendant pros d'un sicle."
51. Baudouin, supra, note 9 at 285-86. See Norcross Bros. Ltd v. Gohier (1918), 56 S.C.R.
415.
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the cables distributed and exploited by the defendant. The fallen branch
brought the cables into contact with the wires leading to plaintiff's house.
The cause of the branch falling was an ice storm. Lord Sumner, speaking
for the Privy Council, held the defendant responsible for the damage on
the purely linguistic ground that "art. 1054 introduces a new liability...
independant of that personal element of faute which is the foundation of
the defendant's liability under art. 1053." And so it came to be
established that liability under art 1054(1) was only defeasible "by proof
of inability to prevent the damage" - that is, proof of force majeure or
casfortuit or fault of the plaintiff.52
In his commentary on Vandry, Baudouin remarked,
Le carat~re sybillin de l'arr~t du Conseil priv allait amener une r6action.
I1 semblait en effet consacrer le principe que l'article 1054(1) C.C. loin de
crier une simple pr~somption de faute, 6tablissait une responsabilit6
objective ou, au moins, une prsomption de responsabilit6,s3
Baudouin's view of Vandry was plainly influenced by Mignault J., who
was in fact the leader of the attack on the objective theory of civil
responsibility, hence the architect of the only regime of responsibility we
know today (the subjective). By Mignault J.'s own admission, "I would
be very slow to hold that the person having machinery under his care
should resort to impracticable or unreasonable means to prevent injury
occurring by reason of the normal working of the machinery."54 Given
this assumption, this new normalcy, it is not surprising that Mignault J.
viewed the Vandry decision as one which "innove visiblement dans un
domaine ou la doctrine de la necessit6 de la faute, comme base de la
responsabilit6 civile, paraissait solidement assise ... Cette d6cision nous
lie, mais je me garderais bien de l'tendre."55 In fact, Mignault J. took
such pains not to "extend" the Vandry decision that he ended up
retracting it on behalf of the Privy Council.
The first step in this process of retraction involved reintroducing the
notion of fault: "Perhaps I may be permitted to observe that holding that
article 1054 C.C. establishes a legal liability does not entirely do away
with the idea of fault, for this legal liability is evidently imposed because
of a presumed fault, that is to say, a negligence in respect of the care of
the thing which caused the damage. '56 The second step involved making
the technical point that: "The extension [by the Privy Council] of the
52. Vandry, supra, note 37 at 676-77.
53. Baudouin, supra, note 9 at 287.
54. Canadian Vickers Ltd v. Smith (1922), [1923] S.C.R. 203 at 212 [hereinafter "Smith"].
55. Dominion Glass Co. v. Despins (1922), 63 S.C.R. 544 at 555.
56. City ofMontreal v. Watt and Scott Ltd (1920), 60 S.C.R. 523 at 545.
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'exculpatory clause' to the first paragraph of article 1054 may now give
rise to new questions of construction." 57 To avoid such questions, the
Privy Council duly restated the meaning of their decision in Vandry in
City of Montreal v. Watt and Scott (1922): "in their Lordships' view
'unable to prevent the damage complained of means 'unable by
reasonable means.' It does not denote an absolute inability." 58
According to Baudouin, those words signalled a "retour en arri~re" on
the part of the Privy Council - that is, their Lordships ceased to regard
art. 1054 as establishing a "prdsomption de responsabilit" (as in Vandry)
and went back to viewing this article as entailing a "presomption de
faute".59 But this is a misreading. Their Lordships' position did not
change a bit between Vandry and Watt and Scott, as can be inferred from
the reference to force majeure and cas fortuit as causes of exoneration in
the sentence which follows the ones quoted above:
If, therefore, the storm in question could be described as a cas fortuit or
force majeure, and if the appellants had shown that they had constructed
the sewer of a size sufficient to meet all reasonable expectations there
would, in their Lordships' view, have been a case where the exculpatory
paragraph would have applied.60
As every civil law scholar knows, it is essential to adduce evidence of
force majeure to negative a "prdsomption de responsabilit6", but it is not
necessary to prove irresistable force to rebut a "pr~somption de faute". In
the latter case, it suffices to prove absence of negligence (i.e. due
diligence), which entails much less. Thus, it was not their Lordships who
substituted one "presumption" for the other. The author of this switch
was Mignault J. who, in "interpreting" the Privy Council's words for us
in City of Montreal v. Lesage, slyly noted:
were the defendant constrained to go the length of proving that the
accident which caused the damage was a casfortuit or force majeure, he
would be obliged to establish "an absolute inability" to prevent the
damage complained of, and their Lordships are very careful to state that
"unable to prevent the damage" does not denote such an inability, but
means "unable by reasonable means", which of course excludes the idea
of irresistable force as a necessary element of exculpation.6'
I would seem that the only contemporary jurist to detect Mignault J.'s
subterfuge in Lesage is Maurice Tancelin, who rightly points out that:
"En ne retenant de ce dictum [of the Privy Council in Watt and Scott] que
57. !bid at 546.
58. CiofMontrealv. Watt and Scoti [1922] 2 A.C. 555 at 563.
59. See Baudouin, supra, note 74 at 287 and 288-90.
60. Supra note 80 at 563.
61. City ofMontrealv. Lesage, [1923] S.C.R. 355 at361-62.
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la mention des moyens raisonnables et en passant sous silence la r6frence
expresse au cas fortuit ou de force majeure, on d6nature evidemment son
sens."
62
The Lesage case concluded the "d~couverte jurisprudentielle" or more
accurately the "ddvolution jurisprudentielle" (when one compares that
case with Leonard) of article 1054(1) C.C. It is important to recognize
that what might appear on the surface to have been a change in
procedure only - the substitution of one presumption for another -
entailed a substantive change as well: namely, a change in the meaning of
the word "reasonable." Whereas prior to the 1920s it was "reasonable"
to expect a person having machinery under his care to prevent it from
causing damage, from that decade on it would "suffice for the defendant
to prove that he was unable, by reasonable means, to prevent the damage
complained of."'63 But this substantive change could not have occurred
had there not been a change in the method of interpreting the Code;
namely, a shift from the nomadic to the paraphrastic method. That
change is evident when one juxtaposes the following two quotations, the
first from Loranger J.A. in Doutre, the second from Mignault J. in
Vaillancourt
A mon sens, la loi sur cepoin4 est claire et se ddduit desprincipes les plus
glimentaires du droit civil je pourrais dire des notions les plus simples d
droit natureL64
[Quand le texte est clair et sans &quivoque on n'a pas besoin de chercher
ailleurs.65
There is one further case which warrants discussion by way of
illustrating the link between the rise of the linguistic method and the
demise (or dispersal) of objective standards of civil responsibility, the case
of Curley v. Latreille. This case involved an action in damages for the
destruction wreaked by a chauffeur who, without his master's knowledge
or consent, took the latter's car on a "joy-ride" down boulevard St-
Laurent. The Court of Appeal held the master responsible for the
damages on the basis of article 1054(7), which speaks of masters being
responsible for the damages caused by their servants "in the performance
of the work for which they are employed", words which the court
62. Maurice Tancelin, Thiorie du droit des obligations (Qu6bec: Presses de l'Universit6 Laval,
1975) at 221.
63. Smith, supra, note 54 at 213; Baudouin, supra; note 9 at 289.
64. See supra, note 15.
65. The Governor and Company of Gentlemen Adventurers of England v. Vaillancourt [1923]
S.C.R. 414 at 428.
108 The Dalhousie Law Journal
interpreted in the light of an analogous expression - "in the course of
their employment" - as used in a Manitoba case.
In the Supreme Court, Mignault J. chastised the lower court for having
"assimil notre droit quant & la responsabilit6 des maitres et commettants
au droit anglais".66 It bears underlining that the Court of Appeal decision
was consistent with the jurisprudence and doctrine under article 1394(3)
of the French Code Civil as Mignault's confrere, Justice Brodeur,
demonstrated in his dissenting opinion.67 Mignault, however, based his
decision "uniquement sur le texte de l'article 1054 ... texte qui ne pr&e
A aucun 6quivoque".68 According to Mignault J., the absence of any
words corresponding to "in the performance of ... " in the French or
English sources rendered them irrelevant, or at best negative guides, to
the interpretation and application of article 1054(7). The presence of
these words in 1054(7), on the contrary, "me paraft clairement exclure la
responsabilit6 du maitre pour un fait accompli par le domestique ou
ouvrier A l'occasion seulement de ses fonctions, si on ne peut dire que ce
fait s'est produit dans lex&cution de ses fonctions". 69
It will be appreciated that as a result of this decision "our law" with
respect to the liability of masters for the damages caused by their servants
came unhinged from "the general law". This raises the question of
whether it was "the intention of the legislature" that the substantive law
of Quebec should diverge from that of France in this particular area. But
of course this question is beside the point. The point is rather that the
difference between the two Codes only came to light as a result of the
application of a new method of interpretation, the "paraphrastic."
V.
In closing, let us consider Lapierre v. P-G. Qudbec, the case in which it
was definitively concluded that "une obligation ind~pendante de toute
faute dans des circonstances telles celles du cas present serait une
excellente chose mais notre droit actuel ne la pr~voit pas.,, 70
The plaintiffs daughter, Nathalie, was vaccinated against measles in
the context of a mass immunization campaign organized by the Quebec
government. A few days later, the child suffered an attack of acute viral
encephalitis, which left her mostly paralyzed and brain damaged. In the
66. Curley v. Latreille (1919), 60 S.C.R. 131 at 136.
67. According to article 1384(3) of the French Code Civil masters are responsible for the
damages caused by their servants "dans les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont employ6s."
68. Ibid at 177, 178.
69. Ibid at 176-177.
70. Lapierre (C.A.), supra, note 26 (cited with approval by Chouinard J.).
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court of first instance, Nadeau J. recognized the causal link between the
vaccine and the encephalitis. He also affirmed that neither the Quebec
government nor the nurse who administered the vaccine committed any
fault. There was the threat of a measles epidemic, so the government
acted responsibly - one could say "out of necessity" - in mounting the
campaign, and its surveilance procedures were above reproach. The
nurse, for her part, had taken all the normal precautions. It was simply
that where vaccinations of this kind are concerned, there is a one-in-a-
million chance of the person vaccinated contracting encephalitis, and due
to "un coup implacable et aveugle du destin," Nathalie was that one.
Nadeau J. upheld the plaintiff's action in virtue of article 1057(5) C.C.,
which concerns obligations which "in certain cases arise from fortuitous
events." Fortuitous events are normally causes of exoneration (see e.g.
articles 1072, 1513 C.C.), but they can also be the occasion of "necessary
acts":
La vaccination est precisment ce genre d'acte n~cessaire ofi on pr~voit
m~me que 'on pourra causer un domage grave dans un cas sur un million
et cet acte n6cessaire est fait pr~cis6ment i l'occasion d'un cas fortuit: le
danger de l'pidemie. ... Il n'est que normal, pour corriger les coups
implacables et aveugles du destin, de faire porter sur la collectivit6 les
risques d'une ... vaccination qui profite A tobt. ... 1 s'agit 1 d'une
obligation d~coulant d'un cas fortuit, comme en dispose 'article 1057. Cet
engagement resultant de rop~ration de la loi seule n'est pas sans analogie
avec celui d'une expropriation, que personne n'est oblig6 de subir sans
indemnit6.71
It bears underlining that Nadeau . reasoned by analogy to, not by
extrapolating from, article 407 C.C. (concerning expropriation).
Nadeau . also found support for his decision in article 2712 C.C.
which, as will be recalled, is one of the key articles distinguishing the
Quebec Civil Code from its French counterpart:
Vu le texte de... [art. 2712] il nous faut considrer que les dispositions de
'ancien droit frangais de m~me que celles du droit romain constituent un
droit suppl~tif auquel il faut avoir recours au cas de silence du code sur un
sujet particulier.... Le Code civilfrangais, en faisant table rase des donn6s
de 'ancien droit s'est de la sorte priv6 d'une source d'obligations
provenant des r~gles de l'6quit6 naturelle lorsqu'on peut les rattacher,
comme la chose est possible chez nous, A des cas fortuits, comme ne peut
manquer de r'&re une 6pidemie probable A laquelle on entend parer par
une programme massif de vaccination. 72
71. Supra, note 12 at 918-19.
72. Ibid at 916.
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Nadeau J. went on to observe the parallel between the case at bar and
Mahoney, having already signalled the pertinence of the doctrine ofJet t
la mer. His reasoning may be summarized in the form of a table:
Proposition jet & la mer Mahoney Lapierre
A fortuitous event storm at sea fire impending
occurs epidemic
A necessary act is jettison of demolition of mass immunization
performed part of cargo a house
A direct and predic- passenger's Mahoney's house Nathalie's bodily
table consequence belongings integrity
of the act is a loss
suffered by a partic-
ular individual
The collectivity be- rest of cargo general conflagra- "herd effect"
nefits from the indi- saved tion prevented
vidual's loss
The collectivity granted granted
owes a debt to the
individual
In my opinion, Nadeau J.'s reasoning was faultless, but this was not
the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, for reasons
that will already be apparent. It would be futile to argue against either of
those decisions, for the only grounds on which one could do so - the
historic droit commun and the general droit commun - have been
outlawed.73
Still, there are certain misconceptions concerning Nadeau J.'s decision
in Lapierre which should be dispelled. Many of these are contained in the
following passage from a case comment written by Pierre Legrand:
I1 faut toutefois se demander de quelle 'justice' il est v6itablement question
lorsqu'est retenu la responsabilit6 d'un d6fendeur tout A fait innocent [i.e.
the Quebec government]. ... Toutefois, comment justifier, tant au plan
juridique que rationnel, une prise de position favorable i la victime plut6t
qu'i l'acteur innocent? Les int6rets en jeu ne sont-ils pas d'un m6rite A tout
le moims &quivalent? Le Code Civil du Bas-Canada a tranch6, d6s 1866. II
ne s'est jammais d6menti depuis. En modifiant l'6tat du droit, le tribunal
s'est improvis6 16gislateur. Nous ne pensous pas exag~rer en affirmant que
son geste met en p6ril la fragile stabilit6 de l'&lifice de la responsabilit6
73. This claim should be qualified somewhat. Chouinard J. did leave the door open a crack
when he wrote in Lapierre (S.C.C.), supra, note 32 at 258: "There is no question that what our
civil law has preserved of the ancient law is not necessarily limited to what the legislator has
expressly adopted and enacted."
Faultless Reasoning
civile m~me. A ce jour, la faute a 6t6 et est. Nous croyons pouvoir ajouter
qu'elle doit 6tre.74
It will be observed that Legrand would have the same law apply to the
government as to the citizen.75 We have encountered this argument
before, in Doolan, only there it was used to opposite effect.
Legrand's second point is that Nadeau . assumed the role of legislator
in "modifying" the state of the law. As should be apparent from the
discussion of the last part, it is not so much that Nadeau J. committed the
"sin" of judicial law-making as that since the 1920s successive
generations of judges and commentators have busied themselves
unmaking the civil law of Quebec.
Legrand's final point is that fault has always been the basis of civil
responsibility in Quebec, and that to suggest otherwise would be to
jeopardize the delicate stability of the Code. If one assumes that the Code
is "logically organized" and that it is not necessary to "know history" to
understand its divisions, this point does seem eminently "reasonable" (but
only in the modem sense of that term).
74. Supra, note 12 at 922.
75. See R.A. Macdonald, "Jurisdiction, Illegality and Fault: An Unholy Trinity" (1985), 16
R.G.D. 69 for some of the difficulties with this system of loss allocation. See further Tribunal
administratif de Bordeaux, 29juin 1956, D.S. 1956.462; Tnbunal administratif de Strasbourg,
9 novembre 1976, D.S. 1977.660.
